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Xe-— <78T2-2 SFO 



CHARLES SUMNER 



AND 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 



D. H. CHAMBERLAIN 



A Review of parts of An Address 

by Mr. Charles Francis Adams 

before the New York 

Historical Society 

Npvember 19 

1901 



ptinttn at t\)t KitjerstiDe prefif0 

I^or Sale by 

W. B, CLARKE COMPANY 

Park Street Church 

BOSTON 



APR 23 1902 



CHARLES SUMNER 

AND 

THE TEEATY OF WASHINGTON 



DANIEL HENRY CHAMBERLAIN, LL. D, 

Besident Member of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, etc., etc., etc. 



A Review of parts of An Address 

by Mr. Charles Francis Adams 

before the New York 

Historical Society 

November 19 

1901 



Sed veteris proverbii admonitu vivorum memini, nectamen 
Epicuri licet oblivisci 

Cicero, de Fi7iibus, V. 1. 3 

I cannot set my authority against their authority. But to 
exert reason is not to revolt against authority 

Burke, Letter I., on a Regicide Peace 



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W. B. CLARKE COMPANY 
Pakk Street Church 
BOSTON 







p. 

Author. 

I P-jf son). 



CHARLES SUMNER 

AND THE 

TREATY OF WASHINGTON 



In November, 1901, Mr. Charles Francis Adams 
delivered in New York city, before the New York 
Historical Society, an address, since published by 
the Society, under the title, " Before and After the 
Treaty of Washington : The American Civil War 
and the War of the Transvaal." This address was 
a little later repeated in Boston in four lectures be- 
fore the Lowell Institute.^ The theme, in Mr. 
Adams's hands, is a broad one, as well as one of 
high interest and importance, which Mr. Adams 
does not overrate, and it need not be said that it 
was treated by him with great ability and graphic 
force. The address is filled with strong expressions 
of opinion and marked by the utmost freedom of 
comment on men and events brought under review. 
Naturally, almost unavoidably, among the topics 
discussed at length is that of the relations of 
Charles Sumner to the Treaty of Washington. 
Intimating that he is using, to some extent, " un- 
published material, — material not found in news- 

1 Accurate and full reports of the lectures appeared in the Bos- 
ton Evening Transcript of December 4, 7, 11, and 14, 1901. 



2 CHARLES SUMNER 

papers, public archives, or memoirs which have 
already seen the light," ^ and styling the Treaty of 
Washington " a very memorable historical event," 
and President Grant, Secretary Fish, Senator Sum- 
ner, and Minister Motley " great historic figures," 
Mr. Adams deals at length with all the leading 
persons and topics covered by his theme. Nowhere 
else can now be found so full, vivid, and thorough 
treatment of this large and influential chapter of 
our history as Mr. Adams here gives. 

The purpose of the present writer, however, is 
closely limited to an examination of Mr. Adams's 
views of Senator Sumner's relations to the Treaty 
of Washington, especially the matter of his removal 
from the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in March, 1871. 

It would probably be safe to say that the public 
had, till Mr. Adams spoke, remained fully per- 
suaded that the cause of Sumner's removal was his 
opposition, and what grew out of that opposition, to 
the San Domingo Treaty in 1870. This cause has, 
however, never looked well on the historical page, 
and the partisans and friends of Grant and Fish 
have not been willing to stand on it. The reason 
specially assigned, both in the senatorial caucus 
which decreed the removal and in the Senate where 
it was effected, was the pei'sonal relations of Sum- 
ner to Grant and Fish, which were then described 
as those of non-recognition and non-speaking in 

^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 1. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 3 

social or unofficial life. These relations, whatever 
of unpleasantness they involved, grew out of the 
disagreement between Grant and Fish on the one 
hand, and Sumner on the other, regarding a treaty 
for the annexation of San Domingo, negotiated by 
Grant by extraordinary methods and sent to the 
Senate in 1870. This treaty Sumner opposed, and 
it was defeated in the Senate, June 30, 1870. 
Motley, who was an old and special friend of Sum- 
ner, was the next day asked to resign his position 
as Minister to England, an act which has been 
almost universally regarded as a blow at Sumner, 
followed, as it was, by a despatch signed by Fish, 
which, in its style and in its references to Sumner, 
far overpassed the bounds of ordinary diplomatic 
propriety^ Of the real motive of the removal of 
Motley, Mr. Adams thus speaks : — 

" He (Grant) consequently regarded this action (op- 
position to the San Domingo Treaty) on the part of the 
Senator at the head of the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, as dm'ing the war he would have regarded the 
action of a department commander who refused to co- 
operate in the plan of general campaign laid down from 
headquarters and exerted himself to cause an operation 
to fail. Such a subordinate should be summarily re- 
lieved. He seems actually to have chafed under his in- 
ability to take this com'se with the chairman of a Senate 
Committee ; and so he reheved his feelings at the ex- 
pense of the friend of that chairman, the Minister to 
England, who was within his power. Him he incon- 
tinently dismissed." ^ 

^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 118. 



4 CHARLES SUMNER 

This is a succinct as well as an accurate summary 
of the proceeding. It is not necessary in the pre- 
sent discussion to notice further the Motley affair. 

Evidently ill at ease regarding the reason assigned 
at the time for Sumner's removal, Grant in 1877, 
six years after the removal and three years after 
Sumner's death, in two interviews, one in Scotland, 
and the other at Cairo ; and Fish in the same year, 
in several newspaper letters and interviews, put 
forward, as the ground of the removal, dereliction 
of duty on Sumner's part in failing to report in 
due time several treaties sent to the Senate and 
there referred to Sumner's committee during the 
session following the removal of Motley. Into this 
phase of the controversy it is not necessary to go 
farther than to say that friends of Sumner pro- 
cured the removal of secrecy from the Senate re- 
cords covering the period named, the last year of 
Sumner's service as chairman, and the charge of 
neglect of duty as specified by Grant and Fish was 
shown to be wholly unfounded. 

In January, 1878, J. C. Bancroft Davis, who 
had been one of Fish's assistant secretaries, ap- 
peared in an elaborate letter in the New York 
Herald} in which, after again putting forward the 
disproved charge of neglect of duty on Sumner's 
part, he brought out, for the first time, so far as 
the present writer has discovered, a certain memo- 
randum which he alleged was sent by Sumner to 
Fish, January 17, 1871, by which he claimed that 

1 New York Herald, Jan. 4, 1878. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 5 

Sumner put himself in entire opposition to any pos- 
sible settlement of the pending controversy between 
England and the United States growing out of our 
Civil War. It does not appear that this memo- 
randum, as exploited by Davis, was effective to 
change the general judgment upon the cause or 
merits of Sumner's removal, or indeed that it has 
ever hitherto attracted much attention in any quar- 
ter. Now, however, thirty years after the event, 
Mr. Adams takes up the theme, and while not as- 
serting that the fact of this memorandum, or any 
other of the reasons given for Sumner's removal, 
was the real reason moving Grant and Fish and 
the Senators, does assert, Jn round terms, that this 
memorandum of Januai^lT, 1871, made it justifi- 
able, necessary, and right for the Administration, 
if it could do so, to secure the removal of Sumner 
from the head of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Referring to Sumner's removal, Mr. 
Adams says : — 

" Under these circumstances the course now pursued 
(the removal of Sumner) was more than justifiable. It 
was necessary as well as right." ^ 

What the circumstances were will fully appear 
hereafter. 

The present question is : Must we revise our 
opinion of Sumner so far as to think that the re- 
moval was just and warranted on the grounds on 
which Mr. Adams puts it ? 

^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 128. 



6 CHARLES SUMNER 

It should be said at once that Mr. Adams is not 
to be ranked with tlie enemies of Sumner. Neither 
in Sumner's lifetime nor since has Mr. Adams's at- 
titude towards him been unfriendly or disparaging. 
If not a special admirer or eulogist, he has been 
and is now wholly unmoved by any feeling, as we 
may well believe, except that of historical justice 
and truth. Grant obviously became vindictively 
hostile to Sumner ; and Fish, as the friend and 
subordinate of Grant, was actively and willingly 
hostile ; but Mr. Adams comes forward as an im- 
partial, cold student of history, and has no interest 
or prejudice adverse to Sumner. His judgment 
is therefore weighty, and must have consideration. 
It compels the reexamination of a controversy 
which is at once complicated and painful, — pain- 
ful in many aspects, — but one which touches the 
fame of a lofty name in our annals. Those, how- 
ever, who vyould guard the memory of Sumner are 
not, on that account, to be rated as enemies of 
Grant or Fish. They wish only, it should be as- 
sumed, to see justice done to all, injustice to none. 

Recalling, then, that in April, 1869, Grant was 
President, Fish, Secretary of State, Sumner, Chair- 
man of the Senate Committee on Foreijrn Rela- 
tions, and JNIotley, Minister to England, it should 
now be said that Sumner had held his post con- 
tinuously since the reorganization of the Senate 
committees on the retirement of the Secession 
Senators in 1861, and, it is superfluous to add, was 
better qualified for the position than any other 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 7 

Senator, if not any other man in the country. Mot- 
ley was, of all Americans then living and available, 
generally regarded the fittest to represent his coun- 
try at the English capital. 

Another event must here be noted as part of the 
tangled web of circumstances which envelops the 
controversy now under examination. The treaty 
known as the Johnson-Clarendon Convention for 
the settlement of the Alabama claims agfainst Eng;- 
land had been signed in January, 1869, during the 
presidency of Andrew Johnson ; but action on it by 
the Senate had been postponed until after the acces- 
sion of Grant. While this treaty was under discus- 
sion in the Senate, Sumner, in April, 1869, opposed 
it in a speech in which he set forth at length the un- 
friendly course of England during our Civil War 
and the vast pecuniary injuries thereby done to our 
nation as well as to individuals. It must be said 
here, peremptorily and once for all, that this famous 
speech was not a demand for pecuniary reparation 
for national injuries, as has been so persistently re- 
presented, though not by Mr. Adams. It was a pre- 
sentation or statement of injuries done ; and it was 
a true presentation. It went in no respect beyond 
the positions previously taken by our government 
through Lincoln, Seward, and Minister Adams, 
during the war and at its close. The injuries done 
were simply put by this speech before the country, 
before England, and before the world, as the actual 
relations of the parties. They were presented not 
as assessable claims or demands, but as matters to 



8 CHARLES SUMNER 

be known and considered as parts of the situation •, 
parts of England's misconduct towards our coun- 
try ; parts of our grievance against England. / And 
it should here be added that these considerations 
— considerations rather than claims — were after- 
wards perverted into pecuniary demands by Grant 
and Fish, and formulated as such by Fish and 
Davis, in an offensive manner, in what is known as 
our " Case " at the Geneva Arbitration, — a course 
of conduct for which J. C. Bancroft Davis is be- 
lieved to be largely, if not mainly, responsible, 
nearly costing us the loss of the settlement made 
by the Treaty of Washington. It may be af- 
firmed, too, that Sumner's speech, when made, was 
approved by the entire country, and by Grant and 
Fish. The evidence of Grant's and Fish's ap- 
proval seems clear, but it cannot be given in detail 
here. Afterwards, Grant and Fish, together with 
Davis and other defenders of Grant and Fish, set 
up that this speech was unfortunate and embarrass- 
ing to the Administration, was made without con- 
sultation with Grant or Fish, and was highly dis- 
approved by them at the time. 

The San Domingo Treaty and the Johnson- 
Clarendon Convention being thus rejected, the re- 
sults being the removal of Motley, the gross and 
carefully studied insult to Sumner by Fish in the 
despatch already referred to, and the keen personal 
hostility of Grant to Sumner ; the matter of tliis dis- 
cussion is now brought down to January, 1871, when 
negotiations were begun at Washington between 



AND THE TREATY OP WASHINGTON 9 

Fish and Sir John Rose, special confidential agent 
of the British government, for the settlement of the 
existing grievances and claims of the United States 
against Great Britain. These negotiations shortly- 
resulted in a memorandum outlining a plan of 
settlement, submitted by Sir John Rose to Fish on 
January 11, 1871. At this stage Fish wished to 
consult Sumner, and finding upon inquiry that 
Sumner, in spite of his deeply felt personal griev- 
ance, was ready to confer with him on public 
business, he met Sumner at the latter's house, 
January 15, and after conference left with Sumner 
the memorandum of Sir John Rose for his further 
consideration. Two days later, on the 17th of 
January, 1871, Sumner gave to Fish in writing 
his views on the memorandum of Sir John Rose, 
now reported to have been, in form and terms, as 
follows : — 

MEMORANDUM FOB MB. FISH, IN REPLY TO HIS 
INQUIRIES. 

" First. — The idea of Sir John Rose is that all ques- 
tions and causes of irritation between England and the 
United States should be removed absolutely and forever, 
that we may be at peace really, and good neighbors, and 
to this end all points of difference should be considered 
together. Nothing could be better than this initial idea. 
It should be the starting-point, 

" Second. — The greatest trouble, if not peril, being 
a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is from 
Fenianism, which is excited by the proximity of the 
British flag in Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of 



10 CHARLES SUMNER 

the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or 
preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed. 
To make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should 
be from this hemisj^here, including provinces and 
islands. 

" Third. — No proposition for a joint commission can 
be accepted unless the terms of submission are such as 
to leave no reasonable doubt of a favorable result. 
There must not be another failure. 

" Fourth. — A discrimination in favor of claims aris- 
ing from the depredations of any particular sliip will dis- 
honor the claims arising from the depredations of other 
ships, which the American Government cannot afford to 
do ; nor should the English Government expect it, if 
they would sincerely remove all occasions of difference. 

" C. S." 

" January 17, 1871." / 

Holding in mind the facts now presented, we can 
clearly perceive tlie situation of the parties with 
reference to the Treaty of Washington, and dis- 
cuss their conduct. Mr. Adams finds in this memo- 
randum of Sumner the ground on which he reaches 
the conclusion that Sumner's removal was not only 
warranted, but necessary and right; right — it is 
to be supposed he means — in all senses of the 
word. 

Mr. Adams expresses great surprise that Mr. 
Pierce, in his " Life of Sumner," has not given 
the text of Sumner's memorandum of January 17, 
1871. Dwelling at some length on the amplitude 
of Mr. Pierce's " Life of Sumner," he says : — 

" The most remarkable and higldy characteristic 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 11 

memorandum just quoted is expressed in about 220 
words ; and yet for it Mr. Pierce found no space in liis 
four massive volumes. He refers to it, indeed, showing 
that he was aware of its existence ; but he does so 
briefly, and somewhat lightly ; treating it as a matter of 
small moment, and no significance." ^ 

Mr. Adams is less than accurate in saying that 
Mr. Pierce treats the memorandum briefly or 
lightly ; for in his fourth volume, after noticing it 
at pp. 480, 481, he gives it full consideration at 
pp. 634-638. He does not give the text of the 
memorandum, for the reason, as it may easily be 
believed, that he had no copy of it. It was a con- 
fidential, informal, unofficial communication of 
Sumner to Fish, a mere memorandum signed only 
by the initials " C. S.," and it seems natural and 
altogether probable that Sumner kept no copy, and 
therefore that no copy came into the hands of Mr. 
Pierce as his authorized biographer. It is not 
incredible, too, that Mr. Pierce felt that the memo- 
randum, as given out by Davis, lacked evidence of 
authenticity. At p. 637 Mr. Pierce says : " Mr. 
Davis assumes to give the terms of Mr. Sumner's 
memorandum of January 17, 1871. Taking it as 
given, etc." — language which suggests possible 
doubt in Mr. Pierce's mind of the genuineness 
or correctness of the memorandum as given by 
Davis. 

Well might Mr. Pierce, well might any one now, 
pause long before such doubt; for the contents of 

1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 100, 101. 



12 CHARLES SUMNER 

the memorandum are not half so " astounding," to 
use Mr. Adams's word, as are tlie time, manner, 
and purpose of its first production by Davis, — 
seven years after its date, four years after Sum- 
ner's death, and in a last attempt to shift the de- 
fence of Grant and Fish to more tenable ground. 
The quarrel or controversy of Grant and Fish with 
Sumner was determined and strenuous, especially 
in 1871, and during Sumner's lifetime^/ Why was 
not this memorandum disclosed then ? Or, if there 
was delicacy or danger, as Davis hints, in making 
it known while negotiations were in progress, why 
at least was it not disclosed after the Treaty of 
Washington had been signed, ratified, and carried 
into final effect ? Why especially, when in 1877, 
six years after its date and three years after Sum- 
ner's death. Fish was giving out self-exculpatory 
letters and interviews, and Grant in the same year 
was putting forward the new excuse of Sumner's 
neglect of duty, was no allusion made to this 
memorandum, or to any other action or position of 
Sumner which hindered or embarrassed, or threat- 
ened to hinder or embarrass, the negotiation of the 
Treaty of Washington ? In all this anxious cast- 
ing about for a better defence, why did not this 
memorandum then come to mind ? Such questions 
called for answer ; and being unanswered, they 
certainly warranted some degree of doubt of the 
authenticity of the memorandum, — at least until 
it appeared in a government publication in 1895, 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 13 

from which it may be supposed that Mr. Adams 
took it.i 

Davis, in his elaborate defence of Fish in the 
New York Herald letter, impliedly states that the 
contents of Sumner's memorandum were privately 
made known to Senators at the time of Sumner's 
removal ; and he says that he had then no doubt, 
and has since had no reason to doubt, that " the sub- 
stitution of Mr. Cameron for Mr. Sumner was the 
practical answer of the leading Republican mem- 
bers (Senators) to the manifesto of the 17th of 
January." ^ Here we have Davis claiming that the 
knowledge of this memorandum by Senators was the 
cause of Sumner's removal, though in the next sen- 
tence but one of his letter he confesses that the rea- 
son given for the removal — to whom given he does 
not say — was that " Mr. Sumner was not on speak- 
ing terms with the President and with Mr. Fish." 
Does any sane man believe that if such a reason as 
Sumner's memorandum, interpreted as Davis then, 
and Mr. Adams now, interprets it, was in the minds 
of Senators when the removal took place, it would 
never have been hinted at by any one in the extreme 
stress of the debates of Senators in caucus, and in 
the Senate ? Or can any one conceive it possible 
that if such a reason was known and controlling, 
and if all allusion to it had been for any reason 
suppressed at that time, it would never have come 

1 House Misc. Docs., 1893-94, 2CExix. 525 ; Internat. ArMt. 
(Moore). 

2 DaTis, Mr. Fish and the Ala. Claims, 139. 



14 CHARLES SUMNER 

to the public knowledge after all occasion for con- 
cealment was past, after the treaty was made and 
executed, and until long after Sumner's death? 
In the Senate, April 28, 1874, more than two years 
after the treaty had been carried into effect, three 
years after Sumner's removal, and more than a 
month after his death, discussion regarding the re- 
moval again broke out, but though the leading 
supporters of the removal struggled hard to put 
the best possible face on it, no remotest reference 
was made to Sumner's memorandum of January 
17, 1871, nor to any other act of hindrance or op- 
position on his part to the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Washington. The conclusion must be 
that Sumner's memorandum, whatever else it did, 
did not play any part in the minds of Senators in 
securing Sumner's removal ; and that grave doubt 
of its genuineness might reasonably have been felt 
when it was put out by Davis, for the first time, in 
1878. Mr. Adams does not seem to give any heed 
to this memorandum as influencing Senators. As 
to the removal of Sumner he says : — 

" The step taken (the removal of Sumner) was one 
almost without jirecedent, and there is every reason to 
conclude that it had been decided upon in the private 
councils of the White House quite irrespective of the 
fate of any possible treaty which might result from the 
negotiations then in progress." ^ 

Such must be the conclusion of any impartial 

^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 127. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 15 

mind upon consideration of what has now been 
stated. 

But the more serious question, the real question, 
remains : Was the memorandum of January 17, 
1871, of itself a good cause for the removal, on 
the demand of the President? The Senate, ac- 
cording to Mr. Adams, merely registered the decree 
of the White House ; the removal had really no 
reference to any treaty ; General Grant was merely 
" now handling a campaign," and — this is Mr. 
Adams's language — " so far as the Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was 
concerned, the man of Donelson, of Vicksburg, 
and of Appomattox now had his eye coldly fixed 
on him," and " with his opponent and objective 
clear to him, he shaped his plan of operations 
accordingly." ^ 

The sole point in Sumner's memorandum which 
needs now to be considered, because it is the sole 
point discussed by Mr. Adams, is its second para- 
graph, in these words : — 

" Second. — The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a 
constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is from 
Fenianism, which is excited by the proximity of the 
British flag in Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of 
the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or 
preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed. 
To make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should 
be from this hemisphere, including provinces and is- 
lands." ^ 
1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 124, 126. 



16 CHARLES SUMNER 

It is well here to observe how wide asunder 
Davis and Mr. Adams are in their views of the 
first effect of the memorandum upon Fish and 
Grant. Davis says : " I well remember Mr, Fish's 
astonishment when he received it. At first he al- 
most thought any attempt at negotiations would 
prove futile." ^ But Mr. Adams says, after a care- 
ful review of the situation as it then was : — 

" When received it (Sumner's memorandum) could 
have occasioned Mr, Fish no special wonder ; except, 
perhaps, in its wide inclusiveness, it suggested nothing 
new, nothing altogether beyond the pale of reasonable 
expectation, much less of discussion. It brought no 
novel consideration into debate." ^ 

Nothing in Mr. Adams's address is more inter- 
esting, or illuminating, or important, than his ex- 
amination of this point. As results, he shows that 
Sumner had long regarded the not remote with- 
drawal of England from this continent and hemi- 
sphere " as the logical development of the Monroe 
Doctrine." Mr. Adams further shows that from 
1840 to 1870 and later, Great Britain herself looked 
upon her colonies as a burden, a source of weakness 
and not a source of strength. He further shows 
that Fish had repeatedly, before 1871 and as late 
as September, 1870, sounded and pressed Sir Ed- 
ward Thornton, the British Minister at Washing- 
ton, on the subject of the cession of Canada, " the 
American claims on Great Britain being too large 

^ Davis, Mr. Fish and the Ala. Claims, 137. 
2 Adams, Before and After, etc., 101, 102. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 17 

to admit of money settlement ; " and that Sir Ed- 
ward Thornton had replied that " England had no 
wish to keep Canada, but could not part with it 
without the consent of the population." Agaia 
Mr. Adams represents Sir Edward Thornton as 
saying to Fish in terms, in reference to the cession 
of Canada : " It is impossible for Great Britain to 
inaugurate a separation. They are willing, and 
even anxious, to have one ; " and Thornton pro- 
ceeds to give the reasons. Mr. Adams also shows 
that " not only at this time (1869) but long after, 
was a comprehensive settlement on this basis (the 
cession of Canada) urged on the British govern- 
ment " by our government ; and that " both the 
President and Secretary of State were thus of one 
mind with Mr. Sumner." Mr. Adams goes on to 
adduce proofs of the willingness of Great Britain 
to consider the cession of Canada in the settlement 
of our claims and grievances, and of Grant's lively 
eagerness to negotiate on that basis. In connec- 
tion with this he states the very remarkable fact 
that Grant, late in 1869, " expressed his unwilling- 
ness to adjust the claims (against Great Britain) ; 
he wished them kept open until Great Britain was 
ready to give up Canada." Mr. Adams further 
says that the English Mission, after Motley's re- 
moval, was offered to O. P. Morton, who entertained 
the offer ; that Grant then proposed that " the new 
Minister should attempt a negotiation based on the 
following concessions by Great Britain : (1) The 
payment of actual losses incurred through the de- 



18 CHARLES SUMNER 

predations of British Confederate commerce-de- 
stroyers ; (2) a satisfactory revision of the princi- 
ples of international law as between the two na- 
tions ; and (3) the submission to the voters of the 
Dominion of the question of independence," — in- 
dependence meaning of course, in Grant's mind, 
annexation.^ 

This part of Mr. Adams's address is a revelation 
which deserves the attention of all who love to 
consider great questions of state. 

In view of these feelings both on the part of 
Great Britain and of Grant, Mr. Adams declares : 

" Sumner certainly had grounds for assuming that 
a not unwilling hemisi)heric flag-withdrawal by Great 
Britain was more than probable in the early futixre." ^ 

He says further : — 

" Up to this point (1870) the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, the President, the Sec- 
retary of State, and the members of the Cabinet gener- 
ally had gone on in happy concurrence. They had the 
same end in view. . . . Thus far . . . the two ques- 
tions of a settlement of claims and Canadian independ- 
ence (that is, Indeijendence from England, to be followed 
by annexation to the United States) had been kept 
closely associated." ^ 

Now came a change ; but, Mr. Adams says, 
" The change was gradual ; for," he adds, " Mr. 
Sumner's policy had a strong hold on the minds of 

1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 103-113. 
- Ibid. 110. 8 Rid. 111. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 19 

both President and Secretary." ^ Suddenly, how- 
ever, Grant and Fish at last — but not earlier than 
December, 1870 — determined to drop the policy 
of " a comprehensive settlement " on the basis of 
the transfer of Canada, and to negotiate for the im- 
mediate money settlement of the Alabama claims ; 
and thereupon, in a few days. Sir John Rose ap- 
peared in Washington, and another basis of settle- 
ment was formulated, which was submitted, as has 
been seen, by Fish to Sumner for his opinion, and 
drew from him the memorandum of January 17, 
1871. Contrast all this with Davis's account of the 
shock of surprise felt by Fish at sight of Sumner's 
memorandum ! If Mr. Adams is correctly in- 
formed, it was Sumner who might well have felt 
such a shock when he first learned on January 15, 
1871, of the abandonment by Grant and Fish of 
their common policy up to this time. If Mr. 
Adams is well advised, Sumner, Grant, and Fish 
had held common views as to Canada up to, or 
nearly to, the interview between Fish and Sumner 
on January 15, 1871. What passed at that inter- 
view we are not told, but two things are perfectly 
clear ; first, that, upon Mr. Adams's showing, 
Sumner in the memorandum of January 17, 1871, 
was merely standing on the same ground on which 
he, with Grant and Fish, had heretofore stood ; 
and, second, that Sumner at the time he drew his 
memorandum had no reason to believe that his 
position would be offensive to Great Britain, or a 

1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 111. 



20 CHARLES SUMNER 

fatal hindrance to negotiations. Nothing can be 
more important in considering the merits of Sum- 
ner's memorandum than these two things. Sum- 
ner was not only adhering to views long held by 
him in common with Grant and Fish, — views fa- 
miliar to the British government in preceding offi- 
cial communications between Fish and Sir Edward 
Thornton, — but he was again urging and formulat- 
ing a policy which he had reason to hope would yet 
be accepted by Great Britain, and which he had 
hitherto known was approved by Grant and Fish. 
Mr. Adams again expressly says : — 

" In his (Sumner's) memorandum, therefore, he de- 
manded nothing new ; he merely, stating the case in its 
widest form, insisted upon adherence to a familiar policy 
long before formulated." ^ 

It is worth noticing, too, that in an interview 
between Fish and Sir Edward Thornton in March, 
1870, Fish pressed upon the British Minister the 
identical considerations stated in the second para- 
graph of Sumner's memorandum. Mr. Adams 
says : — 

" The Secretary (Fish) again urged on the Minister 
(Thornton) that the American provinces were to Great 
Britain a menace of danger, and that a cause of irrita- 
tion, and of possible complication, would, especially in 
those times of Fenianisni, he removed should they he 
made independent." ^ 

It is not to be denied that Sumner wanted 

1 Adams, Befiyre and After, etc., 114. 2 juj^ hq 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 21 

Canada. On many occasions he had expressed the 
wish and hope, — but never except by peaceful 
methods, by the cheerful acquiescence o£ England 
and Canada. He had repelled all other methods. 
" Territory," with his characteristic and habitual 
regard for the rights of all men, he had exclaimed 
at Worcester in September, 1869, in discussing the 
union of Canada with our country, — " territory may 
be conveyed, but not a people." The man, who- 
ever he may be, who can think or claim that Charles 
Sumner had any other thought in his mind, lender 
any circumstances, regarding Canada, than that of 
fair, honorable, peaceful, willing union through the 
free consent of England and Canada, may assure 
himself that he does not yet know him. Of all 
our statesmen, living or dead, Sumner was the most 
scrupulous, the least ruthless. He had great views 
and aspirations for his country ; but his spirit was 
never aggressive or wanton. Mr. Adams well says : 
" Charles Sumner did not belong to the Bismarek- 
ian school of statesmanship." 

Considering the situation, as now presented, when 
Sumner framed his memorandum, the questions 
arise. What did its second paragraph signify, or 
what may it be certainly affirmed was Sumner's 
aim in submitting the memorandum to Fish, and 
how ought it to have been received and estimated 
by Grant and Fish ? It should be carefully kept in 
mind at all times that the memorandum of Janu- , 
ary 17, 1871, was an informal, unofficial, and confi- 
dential communication made to Fish ; and it cannot 



22 CHARLES SUMNER 

be imagined that Sumner for a moment contem- 
plated as possible the use subsequently made of 
it, as we shall see, by Fish. Was there at that 
time the least ground for believing or fearing that 
Sumner meant by this memorandum to set himself 
implacably and finally in the way of all negotia- 
tions except upon the initial condition of a cession 
of Canada? Plainly not. From anything yet 
disclosed, Sumner neither saw nor had reason to 
believe, when he wrote his memorandum, that there 
was a necessity for abandoning the effort to se- 
cure by peaceful negotiation the cession of Canada 
and the withdrawal of Great Britain from this 
continent. He saw, as we may safely suppose, by 
his interview with Fish on January 15, as well as 
by the memorandum submitted to him by Fish on 
that occasion, outlining the basis of settlement as 
then tentatively arranged between Fish and Sir 
John Rose, that the Administration, for some rea- 
son, doubtless unknown to him, had suddenly and 
completely reversed itself upon the general policy of 
the settlement with England which he had hitherto 
held in common with Grant and Fish. Further than 
this, it is not made probable that he had the means 
of penetrating the designs or reasons of the Ad- 
ministration. As soon, therefore, as he carefully 
considered the memorandum of settlement sub- 
mitted to him by Fish, he found no reason for re- 
tiring from the position theretofore held by him as 
well as by the Administration. It did not then ap- 
pear, if Mr. Adams's information is correct, that 



A 



AND THE TREATY OF WASMNGTON 23 

Great Britain would regard the settlement, which 
included the cession of Canada, as impossible. It 
may, indeed, be said that it does not now appear 
that if the Administration had patiently put by 
the negotiations and waited, biding its time, that 
result might not have been reached. As to this, 
Mr. Adams himself finally says : — 

" In the hands and under the direction of Mr. Sum- 
ner, the method he proposed to pursue to the end he had 
in mind might have proved both effective and, in the 
close, beneficent." ^ 

The situation at this moment was a peculiarly 
favorable one for such a policy. It was the govern- 
ment of Great Britain, not the government of the 
United States, — let it not be forgotten, — that was 
now anxious for a settlement. The British govern- 
ment had repeatedly approached our government 
for terms of settlement. It was the British gov- 
ernment that had now volunteered to send its ac- 
complished special agent, Sir John Rose, to Wash- 
ington to seek means of adjustment. Mr. Adams 
tells us why England was so anxious to settle. 
European complications and perils of the gravest 
kind were then staring her in the face. 

Doubtless Sumner saw in all this not only no 
reason for abating terms of settlement, but a most 
hopeful opportunity for diplomatic insistence on the 
terms already known to England, pressed by the 
Administration, and discussed, but not repelled, by 
1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 140. 



24 CHARLES SUMNER 

her Minister at Washington. It would, therefore, 
be first necessary to show that there was danger in 
further insistence, and that Sumner knew, or ought 
to have known, of such danger before he can be 
charged with deliberately and obstinately taking 
up an impracticable, or unwise, or dangerous posi- 
tion. From anything shown by Mr. Adams, no 
such charge will lie against Sumner on account of 
this memorandum. On the contrary, Mr. Adams 
specially states the fact that Grant, as early as 
March, 1870, " had cautioned Fish against com- 
municating to Mr. Sunrintr any confidential or 
important information received at the State De- 
partmenty ^ 

Another ground for relieving Sumner from sus- 
picion of an obstinate purpose to hinder any and 
all settlement is that the second paragraph of his 
memorandum cannot reasonably be construed as 
Sumner's ultimatum, his irreducible minimum. 
Negotiations had but just been begun. The Brit- 
ish special agent had been in Washington but six 
days. The memorandum of Sir John Eose which 
lay before him was the first approach to a new ba- 
sis of settlement. Was it for Sumner, still holding 
in good faith his long cherished policy of coupling 
our grievances with the cession of Canada, — a pol- 
icy heretofore acted on by the Administration, and 
specially dear to Grant, but now suddenly aban- 
doned by the Administration, — was it for him, 
without an instant's demur or further effort, to fol- 
^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 111. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 25 

low the retreating Administration ? He might well 
have felt — he probably did feel — that England's 
anxiety to settle was his own country's golden op- 
portunity, not to extort unrighteous terms, but 
terms honorable and advantageous, the most honor- 
able and advantageous possible, to his own country, 
and not offensive or oppressive to England. If 
Sumner reasoned thus, he reasoned well; he rea- 
soned patriotically ; and with this in mind, his 
memorandum becomes only an effort, timely and 
wise, to secure the most adequate possible redress 
for his country's wrongs. So construed and re- 
garded, his memorandum of January 17, 1871, was 
not impracticable, nor obstructive. 

And how did Grant, according to Mr. Adams, re- 
gard Sumner's memorandum ? Merely as a strategic 
advantage gained over Sumner, whereby to punish 
him for his audacity in opposing Grant's San 
Domingo enterprise. It would seem from Mr. 
Adams that this was all Grant thought of ; and it 
also seems certain that with his " quick eye," as 
Mr. Adams remarks, "for a strategic situation," 
Grant felt exultation, rather than dismay — as 
Davis pictures Fish as feeling — at sight of Sum- 
ner's memorandum. Mr. Adams says : — 

" When Secretary Fish, with Sumner's memorandum 
in his hand, went to Grant for instructions, the Presi- 
dent's views as to the independence and annexation of 
Canada at once underwent a change. As he welcomed 
an issue with his much-disliked antagonist on which he 



26 CHARLES SUMNER 

felt assured of victory, hemispheric flag-withdrawals 
ceased to interest liim ; " ^ 

— which plainly means that, in Grant's view, Sum- 
ner had merely blundered, giving him a weapon 
which he could readily use to worst one whom he 
had come greatly to dislike. That Grant thought 
Sumner's memorandum intrinsically wrong or un- 
wise does not appear. Nowhere, it may be af- 
firmed, does it appear, from Mr. Adams or else- 
where, that the memorandum of January 17, 1871, 
was really anything more than a politic, reasonable, 
diplomatic insistence, at the stage of the negotia- 
tions then reached and under the then existing cir- 
cumstances, on a policy maturely adopted and long 
pursued both by Sumner and by the Administration. 
Still less does it appear that Grant and Fish, in 
fact, did look upon the memorandum, or would 
have had reason for looking upon it, as unexpected, 
or obstructive, or embarrassing. If the conditions 
set forth in the second paragraph of the memoran- 
dum should prove dangerous or obstructive, it might 
be at once modified or withdrawn ; and who can 
reasonably say that Sumner would not have readily 
withdrawn his insistence or opposition whenever 
the point of danger had been reached ? 

So far, then, as Grant and Fish are concerned, 
up to this point it comes to just this, — that Grant i 
saw in Sumner's memorandum nothins; but a 
strategic advantage which he could use to " get 

1 Adams, Be/ore and After, etc, 119. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 27 

even" with Sumner; and Fish saw in it nothing 
new, nothing novel or unfamiliar, nothing unrea- 
sonable, — nothing, in fact, but a reaffirmation of 
an old and well-understood policy of the Adminis- 
tration. 

There is a phase of this topic, presented by Mr. 
Adams, which is undoubtedly new to the public, 
and not a little startling in its character, — the 
use made of Sumner's memorandum of January 17, 
1871, by Fish. Davis had told the public that it 
was used to secure Sumner's removal in the Senate, 
being privately made known to Senators, — a state- 
ment which — besides involving, if true, obliquity 
of a rank type from the sense of justice and fair 
play, in making a private communication intended 
to injure Sumner and giving him no chance to re- 
ply or explain — seems, as we have seen, to lack 
proof or probability ; but Mr. Adams now informs 
us that Fish handed the memorandum on January 
24, 1871, to Sir John Rose. After the latter had 
read it, Fish proceeded to inform him that " after 
full consideration, the government had determined 
to enter on the proposed negotiation ; " that is, the 
negotiation outlined or formulated in the memoran- 
dum submitted to Sumner by Fish, January 15, 
1871, and to which Sumner's memorandum of Jan- 
uary 17, 1871, was a reply. " Should Great Brit- 
ain decide," added Fish to Sir John Rose, " to 
send out envoys to treat on the basis agreed upon, 
the Administration would spare no effort to secure " 
— Mr. Adams here quotes — "a favorable result, 



28 CHARLES SUMNER 

even if it involved a conflict with the Chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Sen- 
ate." ^ Having received this assurance, Sir John 
Hose in the next week — such was the intense anx- 
iety of his government to get a settlement — was 
able to obtain a notification to our government that 
the English government would send a special mission 
to Washington with full powers. Matters now 
moved rapidly, and on February 27, 1871, seven 
weeks only after the arrival of Sir John Rose in 
Washington, the Joint High Commission for the 
negotiation of a treaty met in Washington, and on 
the following May 8th the Treaty of Washington 
was signed. 

The point is now reached where comes the stress 
of Mr. Adams's defence of the removal of Sumner. 
Stated as briefly as possible, his position is, that 
Fish did right to acquaint Sir John Rose and the 
British government with Sumner's memorandum, 
in order to advise that government of the possible 
danger of a failure of the negotiations through 
Sumner's opposition ; and the British government 
having decided to take the chances, upon the pro- 
mise of our Administration to " spare no effort " to 
overcome opposition, on Sumner's part, that the 
President was warranted, indeed bound, to secure 
the removal of Sumner, if possible ; and that not 
to have done so " would," in Mr. Adams's words, 
" have distinctly savored of bad faith " towards the 
British government. Mr. Adams then takes the 
positions : — 

1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 124. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 29 

(1) that " in the conduct of the foreign policy of the 
country, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations was and is of necessity a part of the 
Administration; " ^ 

(2) that wliile " the Executive cannot directly inter- 
fere in the organization of the legislative body, it has a 
perfect right to demand of its friends and supporters in 
the legislative bodies that those having charge through 
committees of the business of those bodies shall be in vir- 
tual harmony with the Administration." "^ 

His conclusion from these premises is that Grant 
was justifiable and within his right as President in 
influencing and procuring the removal of Sumner. 

Here it may be noticed again that Mr. Adams 
makes quick work of the pretexts and excuses of 
Davis and of others for the removal both of Motley 
and of Sumner. He shortly sets down the removal 
of the former as due to Grant's wrath at Sumner ; 
and the removal of the latter, as we have already 
seen, as due to a determination reached by Grant 
" quite irrespective of the fate of any possible 
treaty." He now, however^ justifies the removal 
which he has already said was decided upon for 
reasons " quite irrespective of the fate of any pos- 
sible treaty," on the grounds just above stated, (1) 
that it was due to the British government, which had 
received the promise of the overthrow of Sumner's 
opposition, if possible, and (2) that the President 
had the right to induce or require the Senate to 
organize its Committee on Foreign Relations in 
1 Adams, Before and After, etc., 127. ^ Ibid. 116. 



30 CHARLES SUMNER 

harmony with the Administration. If a slight 
shade of inconsistency is here discernible on Mr. 
Adams's part, in first ascribing Sumner's removal 
to Grant's determination " irrespective of the fate 
of any possible treaty," and then justifying it as 
due to his promise to the British government, the 
explanation must be sought from Mr. Adams, not 
from the present writer. 

Into the question of the right, propriety, or de- 
cency of Fish's conduct, in exhibiting Sumner's 
memorandum to Sir John Rose, and through him 
to the British government and its High Commis- 
sioners, without Sumner's consent or knowledge, it 
is not proposed here to enter. If looked at as a 
matter between man and man in ordinary life, it 
would undoubtedly call for nothing but censure, 
if not execration. Whether in the present case 
the judgment should be different, it is not essential 
to discuss here ; but as a companion piece, it is 
perhaps permissible to refer to Mr. Adams's narra- 
tion of another incident connected with Sumner's 
removal which, it is believed, has not hitherto been 
known to many. He relates that, as one device 
for getting rid of both Sumner and Motley at a 
stroke, B. F. Butler and Simon Cameron proposed 
to Fish to appoint Sumner to succeed Motley. Mr. 
Adams says : — 

" This suggestion also was discussed at a Cabinet 
meeting, and the President expressed a willingness to 
make the nomination on condition that Sumner would 
resign from the Senate ; hut he also inthnated a grim 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 31 

determination to remove him from Ms new office as soon 
as he had been confirmed in it." ^ 

Upon this incident Mr. Adams withholds comment. 

The inquiry then is, finally, whether Grant's pro- 
mise, the promise of the Administration, to " sj)are 
no effort" to overcome Sumner's possible opposi- 
tion, affords a justification of Sumner's removal ? 

First of all, it is to be observed that in point of 
fact Sumner made no opposition at any time after 
January 17, 1871, to the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Washington, or to its ratification by the Senate, 
none whatever. On the contrary, he was in con- 
stant, cordial, and helpful relations with the High 
Commissioners of both nations, in the progress of 
their conferences and sittings ending in the treaty ; 
and in the Senate he made the principal speech in 
support of the treaty, though his removal had been 
effected two months previously ; and he voted for 
its ratification, offering several amendments, though 
not pressing them.^ 

Into the judgment to be passed upon Sumner's 
removal must, therefore, enter the consideration 
that he was in fact removed before he had made 
any opposition, or given hint of opposition, be- 
yond the memorandum of January 17, 1871 ; and 
that he did in fact, at every subsequent stage, for- 
ward, to the extent of his ability, the negotiation 

1 The italics here are the present writer's. Adams, Before and 
After, etc., 95. 

^ Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Sumner, iv. 488-491. 



32 CHARLES SUMNER 

and the ratification of the treaty. What ground, 
it is imperative now to ask, connected with the 
memorandum of January 17, 1871, can be found 
for the justification of Sumner's removal? Recall 
the situation. For a long time prior to January 15, 
1871, Sumner and the Administration represented 
by Grant and Fish had held to the policy of " a 
comprehensive settlement of our whole grievance " 
with England by a voluntary, peaceful cession of 
Canada, a policy actually and repeatedly discussed 
by Fish and Thornton, and one specially satisfac- 
tory and attractive to Grant. Mr. Adams makes all 
this very clear. Suddenly this policy is dropped, 
and Fish presents Sumner with a wholly new 
programme, of which Sumner could have had no 
previous knowledge. Sumner, after deliberation, 
\ reiterates the former policy, but without any in- 
timation of a purpose to push it obstinately or to 
the point of danger. Thereafter Sumner, probably 
perceiving that the abandonment of its policy by 
the Administration had made further insistence un- 
wise or impracticable, makes no opposition of any 
kind to the carrying out of the new policy of the 
Administration. What cause or warrant now re- 
mained for interference with Sumner in his chair- 
manship ? The President's promise to " spare no 
effort " to overcome his opposition ? But he had 
made, was making, or hinting at making, no oppo- 
sition. He might yet do so ? But would it not be 
soon enough to attack him when he gave sign of 
opposition or obstruction? On March 10, 1871, 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 33 

when Sumner was removed by the Senate, he had 
given no sign of obstructing, or wishing to ob- 
struct, the progress of negotiations for a treaty 
which loere then under full headway. Did 
Grant's promise to " spare no effort " to overcome 
Sumner's opposition require him, under these cir- 
cumstances, to anticipate opposition from Sumner, 
and proceed at once to procure his removal ? No 
one can pretend this^ 

But another question. Suppose Sumner should 
oppose the treaty ; was it necessary to remove him 
from his chairmanship in order to overcome his 
opposition? Could he not be quietly outvoted at 
every point when the treaty came before the Sen- 
ate? His removal was, as Mr. Adams is well 
within the truth in saying, " almost without prece- 
dent." It was at best and admittedly an extreme 
measure. Its accomplishment was a difficult task 
even for " the man of Donelson, of Vicksburg, and 
of Appomattox," with all his then overshadowing 
prestige. On test votes in the caucus, the op- 
ponents of Sumner had the slight majorities of only 
five and two, the normal Republican majority then 
in the Senate being nearly fifty. Is it not impos- 
sible to say, in view of this record, that it was 
necessary to remove Sumner, even if he had con- 
tinued the most strenuous opposition to the treaty ? 
His opposition could have been overcome in a far 
easier and not less effective way. 

Mr. Adams urges that Sumner could, as Chair- 
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 



34 CHARLES SUMNER 

tions, have defeated tlie ratification of the treaty. 
He says : — 

" That Mr. Sumner, had he, on consideration, con- 
cluded that it was his duty to oppose the confirmation of 
the treaty, coukl, jjlaeed as he now was (i. e., removed 
as chairman), have secured its rejection is not probable. 
As Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it 
would almost unquestionably have been in his power so 
to do ; not directly, perhaps, but through the adoption 
of plausible amendments." ^ 

This is certainly an opinion for which reasons 
not given by Mr. Adams are needed. " Plausible 
amendments ? " Could plausible amendments, or 
amendments of any sort, escape the notice of other 
Senators, or be passed over their opposition ? 
Would Grant and Fish have slejit while Sumner 
in the Senate undid all their work by jslausible 
amendments ? This sugo:estion of Mr. Adams 
scarcely calls for notice. 



'&o^ 



The present paper cannot well be closed without 
some reference to Mr. Adams's jsositions ; (1) that 
" the Chairman of the Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations was and is of necessity a part of 
the Administration ; " and (2) that the Executive 
Department has " a perfect right to demand of its 
friends and supporters " in the Senate that the 
Committee on Foreign Relations " shall be in vir- 
tual harmony with the Administration." These are 
surely grave propositions. They deserve notice. 

^ Adams, Before and After, etc., 131. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 35 

The Constitution of the United States provides 
that the President shall have power, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, by a two- 
thirds vote, to make treaties. This provision 
must have suggested, it is assumed, Mr. Adams's 
positions. 

Merely remarking here, in passing, that the more 
correct statement of Mr. Adams's idea would seem 
to be, that the Senate itself, the whole Senate, 
each and every Senator, — not alone the Chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, — is a 
part of the Administration ; it is now to be said 
tliat the constitutional provision in question, as the ^ 
contemporaneous history shows and as all authorities 
hold, was put in its present form as a distinct check 
upon the power of the President. It was intended 
to place the separate and independent power to ap- j 
prove or reject treaties in the hands of another de- 
positary than the President. The Senate's power 
over treaties, when negotiated and sent to the 
Senate, is as substantive and independent as that 
of the President in negotiating them. To say, 
then, that the Senate is a part of the treaty-making 
power under our government is to speak accu- 
rately ; but on what theory or ground can the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreijjn 
Relations be said to be, in any sense, a " part of 
the Administration ? " The Administration is the 
President and his official advisers or assistants, the 
Cabinet officers. Or, in its broadest scope, the 
Administration is only the executive department 



36 CHARLES SUMNER 

of the government. The Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations is not a Cabinet 
officer, is not appointed by the President, does not 
hold at the pleasure of the President, is not answer- 
able or amenable in any particular to the President ; 
nor is he, nor is the Senate, nor any part or member 
of the Senate, a part of the executive department 
of the government. How, then, can the Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations be, 
in any sense, a " part of the Administration " ? 
The Senate, as a legislative body, is part of the 
legislative department of our government, but as 
such, it is strictly coordinate with, not a part of, 
any other department of the government. To 
make it, or the Chairman of its Committee on 
Foreign Relations, a part of the Administration in 
any sense, is to make it or the Chairman of its 
Committee on Foreign Relations subordinate to, 
and not coordinate with, another department of the 
government, -■ — an untenable and inadmissible pro- 
position on its face. Coordination is one thing ; 
^ subordination is another thing. Coordination, or 
even cooperation, between two departments of the 
government, is admissible, is provided for, and con- 
stantly takes place, as in the case now under con- 
sideration, of treaty-making ; but subordination, 
subjection, control over, one dejjartment or any 
part of one department by another department, 
or by an officer of another department, is opposed 
to any correct conception of the frame of our gov- 
ernment. All this is plain to a demonstration. 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 37 

Not only is this true as to the frame of our 
government, the intention of its framers, and the 
uniform working and interpretation of our Consti- 
tution, but it is plainly the dictate or demand of 
reason and the public safety. It is the undoubted, 
solemn duty of the Senate and of all its individual 
members — no duty is more binding — to preserve 
and exercise at all times a free, independent, un- 
constrained judgment on all questions requiring 
the judgment or action of the Senate. Neither 
the Senate as one body nor any subdivision of that 
body, nor any individual member of that body, 
owes the least duty of obedience or subordination 
to the President or to the Administration. No 
greater indignity to a Senator in his official charac- 
ter can be imagined than to seek to lower him to 
the position of one subject to the behest of a Presi- 
dent or an Administration, or to regard him as 
holding his position in the Senate, or exercising 
any senatorial function, to any extent, at the 
pleasure or will of the President or the Adminis- 
tration. If nothing else is clear or certain in this 
discussion, it is clear and certain that no Senator 
can be, in any possible sense or relation, " a part of 
the Administration." 

Equally clear is it, for like reasons, that the 
President has no right or business to interfere in 
the Senate by way, of urgency, pressure, or influ- 
ence, or in any manner which affects, or is calcu- 
lated to affect, the perfect freedom of action of the 
Senate, or of a Senator, in any matter committed 



38 CHARLES SUMNER 

by law to the action and judgment of the Senate. 
Such interference rises high above the degree of 
an impropriety, and becomes a wrong, a true out- 
rage upon the official and personal rights, privi- 
leges, and dignity of the Senate and of all its 
members. Such must be the verdict upon any con- 
duct of Grant or Fish, or of any one directed or 
inspired by them who sought the removal of Sum- 
ner by any pressure or influence or insistence 
which interfered with, or which was designed or 
suited to interfere with, the perfectly free judg- 
ment and action of any Senator or of the Senate, 
or with the perfectly independent organization of 
the Senate and of its committees for the transaction 
of its business. 

One of the least valid, therefore, of the defences 
yet made of Sumner's removal under the circum- 
stances of its occurrence in 1871, is the claim of 
Mr. Adams that the Chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations " was and is a part of 
the Administration," and as such that it was the 
right of the President to require Sumner's removal, 
and the duty of the Senate to make it. 

It seems only necessary, in concluding, to say 
that after thorough reexamination and full consid- 
eration of all the available sources of information 
and of all previous discussions, including especially 
the present address of Mr. Adams, the conclusion 
is clear, — that the cause of Sumner's removal was 
precisely and only what Carl Schurz and Henry 



AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 39 

Wilson at the time declared it to be. Said Mr. 
Schurz : " The San Domingo scheme was at the 
bottom of the whole difficulty ; " and he pro- 
nounced the absence of personal relations between 
Grant and Fish and Sumner " a flimsy pretext ! " 
Said Henry Wilson : — 

" Sir, the truth is, and everybody knows it, and it is 
useless for the Senator from Wisconsin, or any other 
Senator, to deny it, that this proposition to remove my 
colleague grows out of the San Domingo question. If 
there had never been an eifort to annex San Domingo, 
we should have had no attempt to change the chairman- 
sliip of the Committee on Foreign Relations, or to remove 
members from that committee. . . . The people of the 
country, say what you may about it, will come to the 
conclusion that at the bottom of it all lies this San Do- 
mingo annexation question." ^ -' 

And the final conclusion is, that no cause has 
yet been shown which does not leave the removal 
of Sumner where the public has hitherto placed it, 
— among the most unwarrantable, grossly unjust, 
and inexcusable acts ever committed in our politi- 
cal history. 



Charles Sumner, throughout a long career, ever 
" clear in his great office," served Massachusetts 
and the nation, his generation and his age, with 
unsurpassed fidelity. Not without some conceded 
limitations and foibles, it may yet be affirmed that 

1 Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Sumner, iv. 473. 



40 CHARLES SUMNER 

the roll of American statesmen bears the name of 
no one who, on the whole, worked for the welfare of 
the whole country and of all races of men more 
constantly, more faithfully, or more successfully. 
It was his lot, late in life, to feel " the slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune." He never quailed 
or faltered in the hard way which he was called to 
follow. Sitting now in the peace and quiet of 
later days, the present writer will perhaps be par- 
doned if he confesses that he has felt the force of 
the closing words of Carlyle's " Life of John Ster- 
ling." Why defend Charles Sumner ? "I im- 
agine I had a higher commission than the world's, 
the dictate of Nature herself, to do what is now 
done." 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



I"' "Hi"'" ""'""" """ "V 

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